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We develop an analytical framework to investigate the competitive implications of personalized pricing(PP), whereby ﬁrms charge different prices to different consumers based on their willingness to pay. We
embed PP in a model of vertical product differentiation and show how it affects ﬁrms’ choices over quality. We
show that ﬁrms’ optimal pricing strategies with PP may be nonmonotonic in consumer valuations. When the
PP ﬁrm has high quality, both ﬁrms raise their qualities relative to the uniform pricing case. Conversely, when
the PP ﬁrm has low quality, both ﬁrms lower their qualities. Although many ﬁrms are trying to implement such
pricing policies, we ﬁnd that a higher-quality ﬁrm can actually be worse off with PP. While it is optimal for the
ﬁrm adopting PP to increase product differentiation, the non-PP ﬁrm seeks to reduce differentiation by moving
in closer in the quality space. While PP results in a wider market coverage, it also leads to aggravated price
competition between ﬁrms. Because this entails a change in equilibrium qualities, the nature of the cost function
determines whether ﬁrms gain or lose by implementing such PP policies. Despite the threat of ﬁrst-degree price
discrimination, we ﬁnd that PP with competing ﬁrms can lead to an overall increase in consumer welfare.
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1. Introduction
Different consumers typically derive different value
from the same product. Firms often respond to this
heterogeneity in valuations by trying to determine
what customers will pay. This is done in a vari-
ety of ways: by understanding the nature of a cus-
tomer’s business and how the product will be used,
by asking about their budget during a negotiation, or
via market research using different collaborative and
content-ﬁltering techniques. The information about
willingness to pay is then used to provide a person-
alized price for the customer.
In this paper, we use the term personalized pricing,
or PP, to refer to the limiting case in which a ﬁrm can
implement a pricing policy based on complete knowl-
edge of the willingness to pay of each consumer.1
1 Because the amount of information required for implementing
PP is high, in practice, ﬁrms may not know valuations precisely.
Hence, our results should be interpreted as the solution to an
important limiting case that provides a useful benchmark—the case
of perfect information.
We bypass the question of how the ﬁrm acquires this
knowledge. Rather, we focus on the implications this
has for ﬁrm strategies. Speciﬁcally, we examine the
following questions: (i) How does competition affect
equilibrium product quality outcomes when ﬁrms
engage in PP? (ii) Does the improvement in ﬁrms’
knowledge of individual consumers alleviate or inten-
sify price competition? (iii) What are the trade-offs
ﬁrms face in adopting PP? (iv) How does PP affect
consumer welfare?
Examples of PP come from the markets for both
consumer and business products. Firms selling large
proprietary enterprise-level software often ﬁnalize the
price through a negotiation. Vendors typically work
with clients to conduct a return on investment (ROI)
analysis to determine the beneﬁt (in the form of cost
savings or revenue enhancements) of the product to
the client. Sweeney et al. (2002) describe such a collab-
orative development of ROI by Teradata Inc. in fos-
tering sales of its data-warehousing technology. The
ROI analysis is used to price software. For instance,
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a California-based in-store demand-planning software
developer sets the price as a percentage of a mutually
determined ROI. This is also common practice in the
sale of enterprise telephone cost auditing software.2
The market for computer servers, storage devices,
and workstations in the Asia-Paciﬁc region com-
bines PP and quality differentiation. Major players
such as IBM, Hewlett Packard, and Sun Microsys-
tems use personalized discounting for different cus-
tomers based on ROI, even at the same quality levels.
There is also a trend towards increasing the degree
of service quality and value-added software differ-
entiation in the industry. For instance, in the UNIX
platform, HP and IBM cater to the high-end mar-
ket, while Sun serves the low-end market (TechWise
Research, Inc. 1999). Other examples of value-based
PP are found in the healthcare (Smith and Nagle 2002)
and chemicals industries.
Online retailers with their ability to collect data
are well positioned to take advantage of dynamic
pricing. In a well-known example, Amazon offered
different prices to different consumers on its popu-
lar DVD titles (Morneau 2000). Although Amazon’s
experiment was short-lived due to a consumer back-
lash, it has since found innovative ways of imple-
menting PP without annoying consumers, through
the use of the “Gold Box.” Each consumer is provided
access to a prominently displayed Gold Box with their
name (e.g., John Doe’s Gold Box) on web pages at
Amazon. Opening the Gold Box provides access to
a limited number of products with special discounts
that are not available outside the Gold Box. The items
offered in the Gold Box are different for different con-
sumers. This allows Amazon to charge personalized
prices. This is an example of the continuing evolution
of PP and an indication of the likely use of such pric-
ing by online retailers. Chen and Iyer (2002) mention
several other examples of customized pricing,3 and
Wertenbroch and Skiera (2002) provide an empirical
study that compares several approaches for determin-
ing consumer willingness to pay.
We consider a vertically differentiated duopoly
framework in which one or both ﬁrms can perfectly
identify valuations of heterogenous consumers.4
2 These anecdotes were communicated to us in conversations with
Steve Acterman, Director Corporate IT Management, Volt Infor-
mation Sciences; Harnish Kanani, Senior Vice President Global
Services, Emagia Corporation; and Tim Johnson, Account Execu-
tive, Apreo Inc.
3 These include major providers of long-distance telephone service
(such as AT&T, MCI, and Sprint), direct marketing companies like
Land’s End and L. L. Bean, who have individual speciﬁc catalog
prices, and ﬁnancial services and banks, who engage in PP through
personalized discounts on card fees. Zhang (2003) mentions Wells
Fargo and MBNA in this regard.
4 We ignore the possibility of mistargeting. Chen et al. (2001) show
that mistargeting can have an important effect by softening price
A monopolist with such information could engage in
ﬁrst-degree price discrimination. As Armstrong and
Vickers (2001) point out, the literature on competi-
tive price discrimination is not as extensive as in the
monopoly case. They provide an elegant framework
that incorporates much of the earlier work on price
competition in an environment with multiple ﬁrms.
Recent work on customer recognition and behavior-
based price discrimination includes Villas-Boas (1999)
and Acquisti and Varian (2005). Much of the recent
work on perfect price discrimination has been done
either in the context of horizontal product differentia-
tion (Thisse and Vives 1988, Chen and Iyer 2002, Ulph
and Vulkan 2002, Bhaskar and To 2004) or monopoly
(Aron et al. 2005). Shaffer and Zhang (2002) consider
perfect price discrimination by competing ﬁrms in
a model that includes both horizontal and vertical
differentiation. Desai (2001) analyzes second-degree
price discrimination with both vertical and horizon-
tal differentiation. Dellaert and Syam (2002) bring
into focus the issues surrounding mass customiza-
tion via an analysis of consumer-producer interaction.
We contribute to the literature in this ﬁeld by incor-
porating perfect price discrimination in a vertically
differentiated duopolistic setting. Because our paper
examines the issue of how ﬁrms’ knowledge of indi-
vidual customers affects the nature of their strate-
gic interactions, it complements the work done on
how customers’ knowledge about ﬁrms may affect
ﬁrms’ competitive strategies (Lal and Sarvary 1999
and Zettelmeyer 2000).
We derive a number of analytical results on ﬁrm
pricing, quality differentiation, and consumer welfare
when one or both ﬁrms have PP. First, if the ﬁrm with
PP has low quality, its optimal price is nonmonotonic
in consumers’ willingness to pay. That is, some high-
valuation consumers are offered lower prices than
some low-valuation ones. Second, when one ﬁrm
adopts PP, the other ﬁrm responds by lowering its
price. This is a competitive response: A ﬁrm with
PP knows the valuation of each consumer, and can
therefore charge prices as low as its own marginal cost
to a speciﬁc consumer. It therefore encroaches into
the market share of the other ﬁrm, which responds
to the increased competition by reducing its price.
Third, when only one of the ﬁrms adopts PP, it
is optimal for it to increase product differentiation.
This can be interpreted as a move to reduce com-
petition with the other ﬁrm. When the cost of qual-
ity is quadratic, if the low-quality ﬁrm adopts PP,
both ﬁrms reduce their quality levels. Conversely,
when the high-quality ﬁrm adopts PP, both ﬁrms
increase their quality levels. We show that when
competition in the market and qualitatively changing the incentives
for competing ﬁrms engaged in individual marketing.
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both ﬁrms adopt PP, the high-quality ﬁrm reduces its
quality, while the low-quality ﬁrm raises its quality.
Finally, consumer surplus falls (compared to the no
PP case) if the PP ﬁrm has low quality, but rises if the
PP ﬁrm has high quality. In fact, consumer surplus is
highest when both ﬁrms have PP.
In addition to the above results, for a wide range
of cost parameters, we demonstrate some properties
of ﬁrm proﬁt with PP. First, within this range, it is a
dominant strategy for the low-quality ﬁrm to adopt
PP. That is, regardless of whether the high-quality
ﬁrm adopts PP or not, the low-quality ﬁrm makes
a higher proﬁt with PP. Conversely, the high-quality
ﬁrm can actually be worse off with PP, and should
adopt PP only if the costs of quality are not too steep.
This paradox emerges because in a vertical differen-
tiation context, the other ﬁrm responds by lowering
its quality. Next, if marginal costs sharply increase
in quality, then both ﬁrms earn lower proﬁts com-
pared to the case where neither has PP. Essentially,
they are trapped in a prisoner’s dilemma.5 However,
if costs are not too convex, both ﬁrms increase proﬁts
when they adopt PP. Thus, our paper highlights that
the cost-of-quality effect can lead to circumstances
wherein ﬁrms can avoid the prisoner’s dilemma situ-
ation when they both have PP.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 brieﬂy describes the model. In §3, we show
that when only one ﬁrm has PP, there are two pos-
sible equilibria, with the PP ﬁrm having either a
low quality or a high quality.6 We next consider the
case of both ﬁrms using PP. In §4, we analyze the
impact of PP on ﬁrms’ proﬁts and consumer sur-
plus. This allows us to consider the question of when
ﬁrms will adopt PP. We discuss some implications
of our ﬁndings in §5. All proofs are relegated to the
online appendix (at http://mansci.pubs.informs.org/
ecompanion.html).
2. Model
We consider PP in a duopoly model of vertical differ-
entiation.7 Two ﬁrms compete in both the quality and
price of the products they offer. Formally, we model
their competition as a three-stage game. At the ﬁrst
stage, ﬁrms simultaneously choose the quality levels
5 Thisse and Vives (1988) obtain similar results in models of price
discrimination.
6 We do not consider the question of which equilibrium will
emerge. In our model, neither ﬁrm has the option of forcing the
other into a particular equilibrium.
7 Shaked and Sutton (1982) and Gabszewicz and Thisse (1986),
building on research by Mussa and Rosen (1978), develop duopoly
models of vertical differentiation and show that to reduce price
competition, ﬁrms seek maximal product differentiation. Moorthy
(1988) extends the basic model by incorporating variable produc-
tion costs and allowing consumers the opportunity to not buy
a product. This results in less than maximal product differentiation.
of their products. At Stage 2, the ﬁrms choose their
prices. When neither ﬁrm has access to PP, prices
are chosen simultaneously. When only one ﬁrm has
access to PP, the ﬁrm without PP chooses its price
ﬁrst, followed by the ﬁrm with access to PP. PP is exe-
cuted for each consumer at the point of sale. Hence,
a ﬁrm that engages in PP chooses its price after a
rival that has a uniform pricing policy (which must
be posted and committed to before sales occur). In
other words, the ﬂexibility implied by PP incorpo-
rates an implicit assumption on ﬂexibility in timing as
well. When both ﬁrms have PP, the order of moves at
Stage 2 does not affect the outcome; for convenience,
we again posit that prices are chosen simultaneously.
Once prices are chosen, at the last stage of the game
(Stage 3), consumers decide which, if any, product
to buy.
If a consumer purchases a product of quality q at
price p, his utility is U = q − p, where  ∈ 01	.
A consumer has positive utility for one unit only.
The type parameter  indicates a consumer’s marginal
valuation for quality. For any given quality, a con-
sumer with a higher  is willing to pay more for the
product than one with a lower . If either of the two
products offers a positive net utility, a consumer buys
the one that maximizes his surplus. Otherwise, he
chooses not to buy either product. It is immediate to
show in this model that, if the qualities of the ﬁrms
are the same, PP adds no value—the result is Bertrand
competition, with both ﬁrms pricing at marginal cost.
Hence, in this paper, we consider a model in which
ﬁrms ﬁrst choose qualities (which will be different in
equilibrium), and then prices.
Consistent with prior literature, we assume that
ﬁrms have a marginal cost of production that is
invariant with the quantity, but depends on the qual-
ity, of the product. That is, both ﬁrms have the same
cost function, but depending on the quality levels
they choose, their marginal costs may differ in equi-
librium. Each ﬁrm has a constant marginal cost for
producing the good, denoted by c. Further, c· is
twice differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly
convex in q. That is, c′ > 0 and c′′ > 0. Quality in this
model is a broad notion that encompasses any fea-
ture that may affect a consumer’s willingness to pay
for a good. These could include features intrinsic to
the product itself (such as durability and functional-
ity), or those related to the quality of the shopping
experience, or the service level provided by the ﬁrm
(such as warranties and customer service). Quality is
observed perfectly by all consumers.
Given the quality levels and prices offered by the
two ﬁrms, consumers make their choices. Suppose, in
the benchmark case of uniform pricing, Firm 1 offers
q1 p1 and Firm 2 offers q2 p2. There will be a sub-
set of consumers (including null) who buy from each
Choudhary et al.: Personalized Pricing and Quality Differentiation
Management Science 51(7), pp. 1120–1130, © 2005 INFORMS 1123
Figure 1 Consumers’ Purchasing Decision by Consumer Type 
0 1θhθl
Buy product hBuy product lBuy neither product
ﬁrm, 1 and 2. The proﬁt of ﬁrm j is its market cov-
erage times pj − cqj . In the case of PP, we allow
one or both ﬁrms to be exogenously equipped with
a technology that perfectly reveals the consumer’s
type before the price is disclosed to the consumer.
Both ﬁrms know which ﬁrm has PP before the game is
played. While the ﬁrm offers the same quality product
to all consumers, it can choose a personalized price
for each consumer. In this case, ﬁrm j’s proﬁt from
consumer  is pj  − cqj . Let cj denote cqj . In
practice, implementing PP may well incur some ﬁxed
costs. However, if such costs are independent of the
quality of the product being offered by the ﬁrm, they
do not affect the qualitative nature of the results. For
simplicity, we treat these costs as zero.8 We consider
pure-strategy subgame-perfect equilibria of this three-
stage game. That is, for any strategies the ﬁrms may
choose at Stages 1 and 2, consumers behave optimally
at Stage 3. Firms, in turn, not only anticipate this
behavior, but also choose optimal prices, given qual-
ity levels, at Stage 2. The subgame-perfect equilibrium
is determined by backward induction, starting with
Stage 3.
Consider the case when neither ﬁrm has access
to PP (we call this the no-PP case). As shown by
Moorthy (1988), in equilibrium at Stage 3, the ﬁrms
share the market in the following manner.9 There exist
threshold consumers h and l such that consumers
with valuations greater than a cutoff level h and less
than 1 purchase product h; and those with valua-
tions between a second cutoff level l and h purchase
product l. This situation is depicted in Figure 1. The
details of the proﬁt equations and reaction functions
are provided in §1.1 of the appendix.
The same intuition also applies in the case in which
one or both ﬁrms have PP. Of course, for the equi-
librium to have these properties with both ﬁrms
existing, it must be that 0< l < h < 1. In solving the
various cases, we show that an equilibrium with these
properties exists.
3. Duopoly with Personalized Pricing
Suppose ﬁrst that only one ﬁrm has PP. There are two
equilibria in this case: one in which the PP ﬁrm has a
8 In §4, we provide guidelines as to when ﬁrms should or should
not invest in PP if the ﬁxed costs are nonzero.
9 Moorthy assumes quadratic costs, but this result depends only on
consumer preferences.
lower quality than the other ﬁrm, and a second one in
which the PP ﬁrm has a higher quality. We consider
each of these, and then examine the case in which
both ﬁrms have PP.
3.1. Personalized Pricing Firm Offers Low Quality
We use the superscript l to denote this case, while
the subscripts h, l denote the ﬁrms. In the spirit of
backward induction, suppose that ﬁrms choose qual-
ities qh, ql at Stage 1, and consider Stage 2 ﬁrst. Let
plh, p
l
l denote the optimal prices chosen at Stage 2
(as functions of qh, ql). Similarly, let hl , 
l
l denote the
proﬁt functions, as functions of qh and ql alone (that
is, after substituting in the optimal Stage 2 prices). For
brevity, in the notation we often suppress the depen-
dence of these functions on qh, ql (this dependence
is clear in the expressions exhibited below). We use
qhl and q
l
l to denote equilibrium qualities chosen at
Stage 1. A notation guide is provided in the appendix.
We restrict attention to qualities q that satisfy
cq < q. The rationale for this is as follows: The con-
sumer with  = 1 is the one who is willing to pay
the most for a given product with quality q. This con-
sumer is willing to pay up to q for the product. If
cq≥ q, a ﬁrm cannot obtain a positive market share
unless it also makes a loss. Regardless of the quality
it chooses at Stage 1, it can always prevent a loss by
charging consumers a price p≥ q, which ensures zero
sales. Hence, we only consider qualities with cq < q.
Because the cost function is convex, it is sufﬁcient to
impose this condition on the higher-quality ﬁrm.
In this case, ﬁrm l knows the type of each con-
sumer, and hence can offer prices that depend on . It
must be willing to offer a price as low as its marginal
cost, cl = cql, to each consumer, if necessary. Further,
consistent with price discrimination, it will charge
each consumer as high a price as it can. At Stage 3,
ﬁrm h (which does not have PP) will operate in a mar-
ket segment h1	, and ﬁrm l in a market segment
l h	. Consider ﬁrst the location of the marginal con-
sumer h, who is indifferent between buying from
either ﬁrm. This consumer must obtain the same util-
ity from either product. If pllh > cl, then ﬁrm l
would lower its price for this consumer to ensure
that he strictly prefers to buy product l. Hence, it
must be that pllh = cl. Therefore, this consumer is
deﬁned by hqh−plh = hql−cl or h = plh−cl/qh−ql.
For now, the qualities could be arbitrary, so deﬁne
h =minplh − cl/qh − ql1. Similarly, l is deﬁned
as the consumer who is indifferent between buying
product l and not consuming at all. Again, it must
be that plll= cl, else ﬁrm l could increase its proﬁt
by reducing its price for this consumer. Hence, lql −
cl = 0 or l = cl/ql > 0. Finally, the consumer who is
exactly indifferent between not buying at all and buy-
ing from ﬁrm h is deﬁned as  = plh/qh. At arbitrary
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qualities, it may be that this leads to  > 1, so deﬁne
=minplh/qh1.
In the pricing subgame, we further restrict attention
to prices that satisfy p ≥ cq for a given quality q.
No ﬁrm is willing to sell to consumers at a price less
than its marginal cost (because this results in a loss).
However, for some qualities, there exist equilibria in
the subgame at which ﬁrm h may price below its cost,
but makes zero sales. Firm h earns zero proﬁts across
these equilibria, so we consider the equilibrium in
which it prices no lower than its cost, cqh.
Now, consider Stage 2. Suppose that ﬁrms have
chosen qualities qh, ql at Stage 1. We show that, at
Stage 2, the optimal price function of ﬁrm l is non-
monotonic in consumer type; that is, it charges some
high-valuation consumers less than it charges some
low-valuation consumers.
Proposition 1. Suppose that ﬁrms choose any quali-
ties qh and ql at Stage 1, with associated costs ch = cqh
and cl = cql, that satisfy (i) ql < qh and (ii) ch < qh. In
the equilibrium of the pricing subgame starting at Stage 2,
we have 0< l < h ≤ 1. Further,
(a) ﬁrm h sets a price
plh =max
{
1/2qh− ql + ch+ cl ch
}

(b) ﬁrm l sets a price pll that is nonmonotonic in a
consumer’s valuation , such that some higher-valuation
consumers obtain lower prices than some lower-valuation
ones. Speciﬁcally,
pll=


ql if  ∈ l 	
plh− qh− ql if  ∈  h	
cl if  ∈ 0  or  ∈ h1	
This situation is depicted in Figure 2. The intu-
ition is that in the market segment 0 	, ﬁrm l faces
no competition from ﬁrm h. These consumers are
not willing to buy product h at the offered quality
and price. Hence, ﬁrm l is able to extract their entire
consumer surplus. However, consumers in the range
 1	 obtain a positive utility from consuming prod-
uct h as well. Hence, ﬁrm l faces competition in this
Figure 2 Prices of Firms l and h When Firm l Alone Has Personalized
Pricing
p (θ)
ph
0 1
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θ θhθˆ
Firm l ′s market Firm h′s market
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fl
,
h
l
l
l
range, and must offer consumers at least as high a
surplus as ﬁrm h to induce them to buy product l.
Thus, the threat of latent competition from ﬁrm h pro-
vides these consumers with a positive surplus that is
monotonically increasing in their valuations.
Now, consider the choice of qualities at Stage 1. In
Lemma 1 in the appendix, we show that at the equi-
librium qualities, given the prices exhibited in Propo-
sition 1, the threshold consumer types satisfy 0< l <
h < 1. Hence, we ignore the Kuhn-Tucker constraints
implied by these conditions, and focus on the interior
solution.
Suppose that ﬁrm l chooses ql and ﬁrm h
chooses qh. Further, suppose that both ﬁrms choose
optimal prices (as given by Proposition 1), given the
two qualities. Then, the proﬁt functions of the two
ﬁrms are
ll qh ql=
∫ 
l
ql−cld+
∫ h

plh−qh−ql−cld
= p
l
hql − qhcl2
2qh− qlqhql
 (1)
lhqh ql= plh− ch1− hplh qh cl ql
= qh− ql − ch+ cl
2
2qh− ql
 (2)
When ﬁrm l adopts PP, the competitive response of
ﬁrm h is to reduce its price. This is the “price compe-
tition effect.” PP allows ﬁrm l to set a price as low as
marginal cost for a particular consumer, to induce him
to buy product l. This leads to an immediate increase
in the market coverage of ﬁrm l, both amongst low-
valuation consumers, and those who were previously
buying product h. In response to this heightened com-
petition from ﬁrm l, ﬁrm h strategically reduces its
price. This response of ﬁrm h, in turn, induces ﬁrm l
to lower its own quality to reduce the competition
with ﬁrm h and tap some more uncontested marginal
consumers on the left. We demonstrate these effects
in Lemma 2 of the appendix, which also derives the
reaction functions for the two ﬁrms.
Of course, in equilibrium, both ﬁrms change their
qualities from the no-PP case. If the cost function
is quadratic, we show that both ﬁrms reduce their
qualities.
Proposition 2. Suppose that the cost function is
quadratic; that is, cq=Aq2. In equilibrium, when ﬁrm l
adopts PP, both ﬁrms reduce their qualities compared to the
no-PP case. In particular, qlh = 0388/A and qll = 0164/A.
Because analytic solutions are infeasible in the gen-
eral case, we numerically solve for qualities using a
cost function cq = q, where  > 1. In the numeric
solution, we check that the constraints 0< l < h < 1
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Figure 3 Equilibrium Qualities of Firms h (Left) and l (Right) with cq= q
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are satisﬁed for each  (so that each ﬁrm has a posi-
tive market share in all cases). The results are shown
in Figure 3.10 If the cost function is not too convex
(in particular, ≤ 12), ﬁrm h chooses a higher qual-
ity in equilibrium. Conversely, if the cost function is
highly convex  > 12, it chooses a lower quality.
The intuition for this is as follows. PP allows ﬁrm l
to charge a price as low as its cost, cl. This lets it pen-
etrate an untapped market segment with lower val-
uations than it is currently serving, as well as make
some headway into the market served by ﬁrm h. This
is the “market coverage effect.” Firm h has two com-
petitive responses to this. First, as a result of the price
competition effect, it reduces its price. Second, when
costs are sufﬁciently convex, it reduces its quality.
By moving towards the low-quality ﬁrm, h increases
the uncontested portion of its market. This further
induces ﬁrm l to reduce its own quality to mitigate
the more aggressive competition from ﬁrm h. How-
ever, if costs are almost linear (i.e., for low values
of ), ﬁrm h increases its quality in equilibrium and
increases its price. Though this entails a lower mar-
ket coverage, the nature of the cost function implies
that the proﬁt per unit sold is higher. This “cost of
quality effect” is also critical in determining the new
equilibrium qualities and prices.
3.2. Personalized Pricing Firm Offers
High Quality
We use the superscript h to denote this case. In this
case, ﬁrm h knows the type of each consumer, and
hence is willing to price as low as phh= ch if need
be.11 The threshold consumer h obtains the same util-
10 A description of the technique used to solve for the equilibrium
in the no-PP case is contained in the technical appendix.
11 Again, for brevity, we suppress the dependence of the optimal
price functions phh , p
h
l on qh, ql.
ity from either product.12 If phhh > cl, then ﬁrm l
would lower its price for this consumer to ensure that
he strictly prefers to buy product l. Hence, it must be
that phhh= cl. Therefore, this consumer is deﬁned by
h = ch − phl /qh − ql. Similarly, l is deﬁned by the
consumer indifferent between buying product l and
not consuming at all. Hence, l = phl /ql. In contrast to
the low-PP case, when ﬁrm h adopts PP, it charges a
price monotonic in consumer valuations.
Proposition 3. Suppose that ﬁrms choose any quali-
ties qh > ql at Stage 1, with associated costs ch = cqh and
cl = cql, that satisfy (i) ql < qh and (ii) ch < qh. In the
equilibrium of the pricing subgame starting at Stage 2, we
have 0< l < h ≤ 1. Further,
(a) The optimal price of ﬁrm l is lower than ch, the
marginal cost of ﬁrm h. Speciﬁcally, ﬁrm l sets
phl =


1
2
(
cl+
ql
qh
ch
)
if
1
2
(
ch−cl
qh−ql
+ ch
qh
)≤1
min
{
ch−qh−ql
cl+ql
2
}
otherwise
(b) Over the market it serves, ﬁrm h charges an opti-
mal price monotonically increasing in consumer valua-
tions. Speciﬁcally, ﬁrm h sets
phh=


ch if  ∈ 0 h	
1
2
(
cl +
ql
qh
ch
)+ qh− ql if  ∈ h1	
Firm h charges a monotonically increasing price
because it faces no competitive threat from ﬁrm l in
the region h1	. Interestingly, ﬁrm l’s price is lower
than even the marginal cost of ﬁrm h, i.e., phl < ch. This
pricing policy enables it to serve a sizable segment of
12 As in the low-PP case, we solve for an interior solution, with
0 < l < h < 1. We show in Lemma 3 in the appendix that the
equilibrium must satisfy this condition.
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the market, despite being a low-quality ﬁrm and not
having PP.
Now consider the choice of qualities of Stage 1.
Incorporating the optimal Stage 2 prices leads to the
following proﬁt functions for the ﬁrms:
hl qh ql= h− lphl − cl=
chql − qhcl2
2qhqlqh− ql
 (3)
hh qh ql=
∫ 1
h
phh− ch d=
phl + qh− ql − ch2
2qh− ql

(4)
In this case, too, the price-competition effect works
in the same direction: The ﬁrm that does not have PP
(here, ﬁrm l) reduces its price to compete more effec-
tively. In response to this “price-competition effect,”
ﬁrm h raises its quality. We demonstrate this in
Lemma 4 in the appendix.
Of course, in equilibrium, both ﬁrms change their
qualities from the no-PP case. We ﬁrst demonstrate
that with quadratic costs, both ﬁrms raise their
qualities.
Proposition 4. Suppose that the cost function is
quadratic; that is, cq=Aq2. In equilibrium, when ﬁrm h
adopts PP, both ﬁrms raise their qualities compared to the
no-PP case. In particular, qhh = 0444/A and qhl = 0222/A.
However, this is not true for all degrees of con-
vexity of the cost function. As in the low-PP case,
if the cost function is not too convex (in particular,
 ≤ 155), ﬁrm l chooses a lower quality in equilib-
rium. Conversely, if the cost function is highly convex
 > 155, it chooses a higher quality (see Figure 3).
Thus, for a wide range of , both ﬁrms increase
their qualities compared to the no-PP case. Here, the
market coverage effect beneﬁts ﬁrm h, which can
penetrate into the market of ﬁrm l. The competitive
response of ﬁrm l takes two dimensions: It reduces its
price (the price-competition effect), and also increases
its quality (to come closer to ﬁrm h). This, in turn,
induces ﬁrm h to increase its own quality to avoid
head-to-head competition. As in the low-PP case, if
costs are close to linear (i.e., for low values of ),
the ﬁrm without PP moves further away in quality.
That is, ﬁrm l reduces its quality, with a correspond-
ing reduction in price. This results in lower market
coverage, but a higher proﬁt per unit, due to the cost-
of-quality effect. Therefore, starting from the no-PP
case, if the cost function is convex enough, the non-PP
ﬁrm seeks to reduce quality differentiation and come
closer to the PP ﬁrm in the quality space. That is, if
the PP ﬁrm has a low quality, in equilibrium both
ﬁrms end up with lower qualities than previously.
The converse outcome occurs if the PP ﬁrm chooses
high quality; that is, both ﬁrms end up with higher
qualities. Further, the ﬁrm without PP offers a lower
price than the corresponding price in the no-PP case.
3.3. Both Firms Have Personalized Pricing
We denote this case with the superscript b. Suppose
that the ﬁrms choose qualities qh and ql at Stage 1.
Then, h = ch − cl/qh − ql, l = cl/ql, and  = ch/qh.
Recall that ﬁrm h sells to consumers in the region
h1	 and ﬁrm l in the region l h	. As in the
low-PP case,  represents the point beyond which
ﬁrms compete for consumers, so that consumers in
the region l 	 are not willing to buy good h at any
price ch or higher.13
Consider Stage 2 of this game, where the ﬁrms
choose their price schedule, given qualities qh, ql. Let
pbh be the optimal price charged by ﬁrm h to the
consumer of type . This is the price at which he
is exactly indifferent between buying the low-quality
product at cl (the lowest price ﬁrm l is willing to
charge) and the high-quality product h at pbh. There-
fore, qh−pbh= ql−cl or pbh= cl+qh−ql. As in
the high-PP case, this price is strictly increasing in .
Consider the price charged by ﬁrm l. The pricing
function is similar to the one in the low-PP case, with
the one difference that ﬁrm h is willing to price as low
as ch to any consumer. Hence, the optimal price func-
tion for ﬁrm l is pbl = ql for  ∈ l 	 and pbl =
ch − hqh − ql for  ∈  h	. As before, in the latter
region, the price of ﬁrm l is declining in a consumer’s
willingness to pay. Stepping back to Stage 1, we incor-
porate the optimal Stage 2 prices into the ﬁrms’ proﬁt
functions to obtain
bhqh ql=
∫ 1
h
cl + qh− ql− ch d
= qh− ql − ch+ cl
2
2qh− ql
 (5)
bl qh ql =
∫ 
l
ql − cl d+
∫ h

ch− qh− ql− cl d
= chql − qhcl
2
2qhqlqh− ql
 (6)
Comparing Equations (5) and (2), we observe that the
proﬁt function of ﬁrm h, when both ﬁrms have PP,
is exactly the same as in the case when only ﬁrm l
has PP. Hence, ﬁrm h’s reaction function in the two
cases is the same as well. Similarly, comparing Equa-
tions (6) and (3), the proﬁt function of ﬁrm l, when
both ﬁrms have PP, is exactly the same as in the case
when only ﬁrm h has PP. Hence, l’s reaction function
in the two cases is the same as well. The analysis of
the previous two cases can now be directly used when
both ﬁrms have PP.
We show that when both ﬁrms have PP, both ﬁrms
choose a lower quality than when only ﬁrm h has PP.
13 We show in the proof of Proposition 5 in the online appendix that
the equilibrium satisﬁes 0< l < h < 1.
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Table 1 Summary of Equilibrium Results When cq= Aq2
Neither ﬁrm has PP Low-PP case High-PP case Both ﬁrms have PP
Firm h l h l h l h l
Quality 0
410/A 0
199/A 0
388/A 0
164/A 0
444/A 0
222/A 0
4/A 0
2/A
Market coverage 0.279 0.345 0.224 0.612 0.444 0.222 0.4 0.4
Average price 0
227/A 0
075/A 0
201/A 0
056/A 0
247/A 0
074/A 0
2/A 0
06/A
Proﬁt 0
016/A 0
012/A 0
011/A 0
018/A 0
022/A 0
006/A 0
016/A 0
008/A
Consumer surplus 0
047/A 0
045/A 0
049/A 0
12/A
Note that this result does not depend on additional
restrictions on the cost function. In comparing the
qualities to the case when only ﬁrm l has PP, we
ﬁnd that both qualities are higher when the cost func-
tion is convex enough, but lower when the cost func-
tion is not too convex. Numerically, for the function
cq= q, when > 13, both qualities are higher than
in the low-PP case. We analytically prove this latter
result for the quadratic cost function.
Proposition 5. Consider the case in which both ﬁrms
have PP.
(i) In equilibrium, both ﬁrms offer a lower quality than
in the case where only ﬁrm h has PP. That is, qbh < q
h
h and
qbl < q
h
l .
(ii) Suppose that the cost function is quadratic, so
cq=Aq2. Then, in equilibrium, both ﬁrms offer a higher
quality than in the case where only ﬁrm l has PP. That is,
qbh = 04/A> qlh and qbl = 02/A> qll .
When costs are quadratic, compared to the case
when neither ﬁrm had PP, in equilibrium the high-
quality ﬁrm lowers its quality and the low-quality
ﬁrm raises its quality. Thus, both ﬁrms actually come
closer to each other in quality. A subtle consequence
of both ﬁrms having PP is that the increase in pric-
ing ﬂexibility levels the playing ﬁeld. Because both
ﬁrms can now price at marginal cost for the threshold
customer, the price competition effect leads to intensi-
ﬁed competition for market share. Further, both have
an incentive to compete more aggressively, so the rel-
ative product differentiation between the two ﬁrms
decreases, which in turn increases the market cover-
age of each ﬁrm. However, for increasingly convex
cost structures, the additional burden of the cost-of-
quality effect leaves both ﬁrms worse off. The inten-
siﬁed price competition implies that consumers are
better off.
4. Firm Proﬁts and Consumer Surplus
In this section, we examine which ﬁrms are likely to
adopt PP and the resultant consumer welfare. Sup-
pose that neither ﬁrm has PP. We assume that after
one or both ﬁrms adopt PP, the quality rankings of
the ﬁrms do not change. That is, the low-quality ﬁrm,
when neither ﬁrm had PP, remains the low-quality
ﬁrm when one or both ﬁrms have PP. Quality lev-
els are tantamount to brand equity, and signiﬁcant
changes to quality are likely to be costly. This is espe-
cially true when quality rankings are reversed. By
contrast, local or marginal changes to quality can be
made in a continuous fashion. Hence, we now con-
sider ﬁrm l acquiring PP, or ﬁrm h acquiring PP,
or both. First, consider the quadratic cost case, with
cq=Aq2. In Table 1, we exhibit equilibria under dif-
ferent settings for this case.
The consumer surplus (CS) shown above is deﬁned
in each of the four cases as
CS=
∫ h
l
ql − pl d+
∫ 1
h
qh− ph d
where pl and ph are, respectively, the prices paid
in equilibrium by a consumer of type  buying good l
and good h.14 For example, in the case when the
PP ﬁrm has low quality, we have ph = plh, which
is independent of , and pl = pll, as given in
Proposition 1.
Note that the results in the case when neither ﬁrm
has PP correspond exactly to those of Moorthy (1991).
The average price displayed in the table is the aver-
age of the prices paid by different consumers for the
good. In the case when neither ﬁrm has PP, all con-
sumers pay the same price. When both ﬁrms have PP,
due to the intensiﬁed competition, the average price
of both ﬁrms is the lowest across all cases. Further,
the overall market coverage is at its highest. Hence,
CS is maximized in this case.
As Table 1 shows, both ﬁrms have an incentive
to adopt PP when costs are quadratic, regardless of
whether the other ﬁrm also has PP. However, the
ﬁrms are trapped in a prisoners’ dilemma: If both
ﬁrms adopt PP, their proﬁts are each lower than in
the no-PP case. Even though there is a market cov-
erage effect that boosts market share, the deleterious
impact of the price competition effect is that the aver-
age price of each sale is lower. Further, due to the cost-
of-quality effect the proﬁts dip, leaving both ﬁrms
worse off as a result. We summarize the quadratic
case as follows. The proof follows directly by compar-
ison across the columns in Table 1.
14 Because this CS expression applies to each of the four cases, we
omit the superscript on prices and qualities.
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Figure 4 Proﬁt of Firm l When Firm h Does Not (Left) and Does (Right) Have Personalized Pricing
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Proposition 6. Suppose that costs are quadratic, so
cq=Aq2. Then,
(i) If one ﬁrm alone adopts PP, its proﬁt increases com-
pared to the case when neither ﬁrm has PP. However, if
both ﬁrms have PP, each ﬁrm has lower proﬁts than in the
no-PP case.
(ii) CS is highest when both ﬁrms have PP. Further, it
is higher when only ﬁrm h has PP, compared to the cases
when either ﬁrm l alone or neither ﬁrm has PP.
Next, consider the case cq = q, where  > 1. As
before, we numerically compare equilibria across the
different cases. We ﬁnd that CS remains highest in
the case when both ﬁrms have PP. This points out
the beneﬁts of competition when there is perfect price
discrimination, in contrast to the scenario where there
is only a monopolist, which results in zero CS.15
Observation 1. For all  > 1, CS is higher when
both ﬁrms have PP, as compared to any of the other
cases.
When both ﬁrms have PP, ﬁrm h charges a price
pbh = cl + qh − ql to its consumers. Compare this
to the price it charges when ﬁrm l does not have PP:
phh = phl + qh − ql. If ﬁrm l now adopts PP, the
greater competition leads to a lower price for con-
sumers of ﬁrm h, and a corresponding increase in
welfare. CS falls compared to the no-PP case if the
PP ﬁrm has low quality, but rises if the PP ﬁrm has
high quality. When ﬁrm l has PP, it extends its market
reach to a segment previously untapped because it
can price as low as marginal cost. However, a segment
of ﬁrm l’s consumers receive no surplus, because they
pay a price exactly equal to their willingness to pay.
Conversely, if ﬁrm h has PP, it faces competition from
ﬁrm l throughout its market segment, and is forced
to concede some surplus to consumers.
Observation 2. For  ∈ 14	, it is a dominant
strategy for ﬁrm l to adopt PP. That is, regardless of
whether ﬁrm h has PP, ﬁrm l should adopt PP.
15 Bhaskar and To (2004) obtain similar results in their framework.
Figure 4 demonstrates the increase in proﬁt to ﬁrm l
when it adopts PP. The ﬁgure on the left illustrates the
case of neither ﬁrm having PP, and the ﬁgure on the
right, the case of ﬁrm h having PP. We emphasize that
the cost of acquiring a resource to enable PP is not fac-
tored into this calculation. Such a cost can be incorpo-
rated as follows. The vertical gap between the dashed
and solid line indicates the gain to ﬁrm l from PP.
It will adopt PP if and only if this gap exceeds the
ﬁxed cost of adopting PP.
Observation 3. Regardless of whether ﬁrm l has
PP, ﬁrm h should adopt PP only if the cost function
is not too convex. In particular, there exists an  ∈
253	 such that if  >  and ﬁrm h adopts PP, its
proﬁts decrease.
Figure 5 demonstrates this result. How can the
proﬁt of ﬁrm h decrease when it adopts PP? Recall
that when ﬁrm h adopts PP and ﬁrm l does not
have PP, ﬁrm l responds by reducing its price. This
induces ﬁrm h to increase its quality. Increasing qual-
ity is especially costly when the cost function is steep;
indeed, it is costly enough in this case to outweigh
the beneﬁts of charging consumers according to their
willingness to pay. A similar intuition holds when
ﬁrm l has PP. If ﬁrm h adopts PP in this situation,
the new equilibrium sees both ﬁrms at a higher qual-
ity, which is correspondingly costly for ﬁrm h. Again,
note that this result does not factor in a cost for imple-
menting PP. With such a cost, ﬁrm h has even less
incentive to adopt PP. Together, these results imply
the following.
Observation 4. PP by both ﬁrms need not lead to
a prisoner’s dilemma situation in which all ﬁrms are
worse off. If both ﬁrms adopt PP, then, for a lower
level of convexity of the cost function, both ﬁrms have
higher proﬁts compared to the case when neither ﬁrm
has PP. However, the market shares increase for both
ﬁrms, for all .
The result on proﬁts can be seen by comparing the
proﬁts of the two ﬁrms in Figures 4 and 5, between
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Figure 5 Proﬁt of Firm h When Firm l Does Not (Left) and Does (Right) Have Personalized Pricing
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the cases “Neither ﬁrm has PP” and “Both ﬁrms
have PP.” PP increases the pricing ﬂexibility of both
ﬁrms. An obvious consequence of this is more intense
price competition. However, because the ﬁrms also
respond by strategically changing qualities, the cost-
of-quality effect plays a crucial role in determining
the net change in proﬁts. This ensures that PP does
not invariably lead to a prisoner’s dilemma.
5. Managerial Implications and
Conclusions
The practice of PP is important in both ofﬂine and
online channels. Our results show that an appro-
priate pricing strategy must take into account both
consumers’ willingness to pay and competition in a
particular market segment. Ignoring either one can
result in lower proﬁts. In our model, if the low-quality
ﬁrm deploys PP, it is optimal for it to use a non-
monotonic price schedule. Thus, some high-valuation
consumers are charged lower prices than some lower-
valuation consumers. An example of such pricing
comes from the hardware industry for RISC/NT
servers and high-end workstations wherein it is quite
common to charge different prices to different cus-
tomers for the same quality and same quantity. Large
customers are able to extract huge discounts, despite
valuing the product very highly. On the other hand,
smaller enterprises obtain lower discounts because no
other ﬁrm competes for their demand (because the
proﬁt margins are much lower). In the latter segment,
manufacturers often price according to the customers’
willingness to pay and in the process capture most of
their surplus. Consequently, they are able to extract
higher proﬁts from some undercontested customers.
Conversely, their margins are also squeezed by some
large customers who play the ﬁrms against each other
and win price concessions.
Our model also sheds light on the different prod-
uct quality choices made by ﬁrms, given that one
or both ﬁrms implement PP. When a low-quality
ﬁrm adopts PP, both ﬁrms reduce their quality lev-
els in equilibrium. In the IT hardware industry, this
is often done through stripping off some value-
added customer service, such as next-day on-site
repair versus same-day 8-hour repair, or a 99%-
uptime guarantee versus 99.95%.16 Conversely, if the
high-quality ﬁrm adopts PP, both ﬁrms should aug-
ment the quality levels of their offerings by pro-
viding additional product features or services. For
instance, HP differentiates itself by providing higher
quality, new generation Web-based applications, as
well as clustering and security management software
embedded in the same hardware box. (See http://
www.hp.com/hpinfo/execteam/speeches/ﬁorina/
oracleapps_02.html.)
The critical issue for managers in vertically differ-
entiated industries to keep in mind in adopting PP
is the interplay between two countervailing effects:
increased market coverage and intensiﬁed competi-
tion, given the convexity of the cost function. The
increase in market coverage makes PP attractive.
However, aggravated price competition hurts ﬁrms’
proﬁts. Further, optimal qualities of ﬁrms change.
Therefore, the net effect of PP also depends on
the nature of the cost function. For a lower level of
convexity of the cost function, both ﬁrms have higher
proﬁts compared to the case when neither ﬁrm has PP,
and hence, are able to avoid the prisoner’s dilemma
situation. With moderately convex costs,  ∈ 153	,
both low- and high-quality ﬁrms have an incentive to
adopt PP, regardless of the other ﬁrm’s actions. How-
ever, both ﬁrms are better off in the scenario where
neither has PP, as compared to both having PP, result-
ing in a prisoner’s dilemma situation. Conversely,
if  > 3, only the low-quality ﬁrm will adopt PP
because the high-quality ﬁrm reduces its own proﬁt
by adopting PP.
16 The cost difference to the consumer between, say, a 99%-uptime
guarantee and a 99.95% guarantee is substantial, so this difference
is nontrivial.
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Finally, our model also demonstrates that con-
sumers would beneﬁt if higher-quality ﬁrms adopt PP.
In the event that all ﬁrms adopt PP, consumers would
beneﬁt the most. Thus, we conclude that, in a competi-
tive scenario, increasing knowledge about consumers’
willingness to pay should eventually lead to an overall
increase in consumer welfare.
One limitation of this paper is that we only con-
sider a single product offering by each ﬁrm, whereas
in practice ﬁrms often offer multiple products. In the
extreme case, one can conceive of ﬁrms offering a per-
sonalized quality to each consumer, in addition to
a personalized price. If both ﬁrms have the ability
to customize product quality at no additional cost,
Bertrand competition for each consumer is inevitable,
and both ﬁrms will be held to zero proﬁt. Hence, a
proper study of customization must therefore incorpo-
rate additional features not considered in our model,
such as horizontal differentiation or differences in the
customization ability of ﬁrms. Another limitation is
that we assume that a ﬁrm with the ability to per-
sonalize prices knows the willingness to pay of each
consumer for each possible quality level. In practice,
of course, we would expect ﬁrms to be less certain
about the valuations of each consumer for each possi-
ble quality level. If the consumer type is observed only
with some noise, the intuition of Chen et al. (2001) sug-
gests that price competition may be softened. Thus,
our results should be interpreted as the solution to an
important limiting case—the case of perfect informa-
tion. Nevertheless, it is an important case to consider
because the effects we identify in this limiting case will
also be present in a general case.
An online appendix to this paper is available at
http://mansci.pubs.informs.org/ecompanion.html.
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